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Over the past several years, elected officials, civic organizations,
academics and influential citizens have revitalized calls for Penn-
sylvanians to change the way state judges are selected. These in-
dividuals and groups support an appointive system called "merit
selection" to replace Pennsylvania's 160-year-old electoral system
for judicial selection.
Under the current system, all judges of the Pennsylvania Uni-
fied Judicial System are selected through partisan elections.'
Common pleas and appellate court judges are elected to ten-year
terms,2 and may serve as regularly commissioned judges until age
seventy.3 At the end of each term, common pleas and appellate
* Darren M. Breslin, Esquire is the Special Projects Advisor for the Administrative
Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC). He also serves as counsel to the Pennsylvania
Commission on Judicial Independence. Special thanks are extended to State Court Admin-
istrator Zygmont A. Pines, Esquire for his helpful suggestions and observations and for
providing invaluable reference material. Thanks are also extended to AOPC legal intern
Danielle Goeble for her competent editing and cite-checking. The author wishes to note
that all of the opinions, as well as any errors in this article, are his own.
1. PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a); see also PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b) (providing that vacan-
cies may be filled by an interim gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent of
the Senate).
2. Id. at § 15(a).
3. Id. at § 16(b).
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court judges may run for reelection, or they may seek another
term by appearing on a non-partisan ballot in a ''yes"~ or "no"~ re-
tention election.4 If a majority of the electorate votes to retain the
jurist, he or she will be commissioned to serve another full term
(subject to mandatory retirement). Judges elected to Philadel-
phia's municipal court, traffic court, and magisterial district court
serve six-year terms, but the latter are not eligible for retention.5
Pennsylvania Governor Edward G. Rendell, the Pennsylvania
Bar Association, and Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts (PMC),
among others, are calling for a constitutional amendment, or even
a constitutional convention, to change how appellate court judges
are initially selected. These advocates favor a system where a
commission would screen and recommend a number of candidates
for judicial office to the governor.6 The governor would then no-
minate an individual from this list. The nominee would need se-
nate confirmation before serving as a judge. Under PMC's pro-
posal, after some period of time, that judge would stand for a non-
partisan retention election before the voters.7 In June 2010, in
light of the Luzerne County judicial corruption scandal, Governor
Rendell suggested expanding the merit selection system to county
common pleas jurists as well, if desired by the county electorate. 8
Pennsylvanians are not alone in debating the best judicial selec-
tion method. Citizens, politicians, and advocacy groups in other
states are grappling with the same question. In Missouri, for ex-
ample, a state well known for its adoption in 1940 of a "model"
judicial merit-selection (appointive) system, a movement is un-
derway to abandon judicial appointments and return to an elective
process for judges "in urban areas and in higher courts."
Numerous articles and position papers have been written extol-
ling the virtues of one judicial selection method over another.10
4. Id. at § 15(b).
5. Id.
6. See Press Conference, Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Pennsylvania Ready for
Merit Selection (June 9, 2010), http://www.pmconlinc.org/nodc/33 I.
7. Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Merit Selection,
http:(/www.pmeonline.org/choosingjudges/meritselection (last visited July 6, 2010).
8. Robert Swift, Split Seen on County Merit Selection Option, SCRANTON TIMES TRIB.,
June 10, 2010, available at http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/split-seen-on-county-merit-
selection -option- 1. 838306.
9. See, e.g., Jo Mannies, Roy Blunt Sides with Effort to Change Missouri's Judicial-
Selection System, ST. Louis BEACON, June 9, 2010, available at
http:I/www. stlbeacon.org/content/view/102965/3 14/.
10. Compare Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1077 (2007), Symposium, The Case for Judicial Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 353
(2002), and Bridget E. Montgomery & Christopher C. Conner, Partisan Elections: The
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The purpose of this article is not to weigh in on the current discus-
sion, but rather to first examine how Pennsylvania arrived at the
current system of judicial selection, and then focus on a key aspect
of both the current and proposed judicial selection alternatives:
nonpartisan, noncompetitive merit-retention elections."1 While
this is not the first or most comprehensive article to chronicle
Pennsylvania's judicial selection history,12 a contemporary review
of the historical roots of the state's current selection method, and
an in depth examination of how and why the Commonwealth de-
vised the current merit-retention system for judicial reelections
may be beneficial in the current debate over judicial selection al-
tern atives.-
HI. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Since the founding of the United States, Pennsylvanians have
utilized various methods for selecting jurists. Under the 1776
Pennsylvania Constitution, judges were appointed by the Execu-
tive Council (the 1776 Constitution did not provide for the office of
governor) for seven-year terms. 13 Judges were eligible for reap-
pointment at the end of each term.14 This method of judicial selec-
tion essentially mirrored judicial selection during Pennsylvania's
colonial period. 15
Under the 1790 Constitution, judges were appointed by the gov-
ernor. 16 As with judges appointed to serve in the newly estab-
lished federal judiciary, Pennsylvania judges served during good
behavior-so-called "life tenure."17
Albatross of Pennsylvania's Appellate Judiciary, 98 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1993), with Hon. Peter
Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections are Preferable to Merit
Selection Systems, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2004).
11. Throughout this article words "retention" and "merit -retention" are used interchan-
geably. "Merit-retention" was used by delegates to Pennsylvania's 1967.68 Constitutional
Convention to suggest judges would be retained or removed from office by the voters on
their records, or merit, and not on the basis of their political parties. See, e.g., 1
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1967-1968, at 1042.43 (1969).
12. For an excellent article chronicling the history of judicial selection in Pennsylvania,
see THE COMMITTrEE OF SEVENTY, JUDICIAL SELECTION GOVERNANCE STUDY (1983), availa-
ble at http://www.seventy.org/Downloads/Policy-&-ReformlGovernance-Studies/1983 -
Judicial -Selection -Governance_-Study.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE OF 70].
13. PA. cONST of 1776 ch. 11, §§ 20, 23.
14. PA. CONST. of 1776 ch. 11, § 23.
15. See, e.g., An Act for Establishing Courts of Judicature in This Province § 3 (May 22,
1722), in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PE~NNSYLVANIA 310 (John Purdon ed., 1818) (noting
that judges were appointed by the provincial governor or lieutenant governor).
16. PA. CONST. of 1790 art. 11, § 8.
17. PA. CONST. of 1790 art. V, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1.
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In the 1830s, reformers in Pennsylvania became dissatisfied
with what they deemed "excessive patronage" by the governor.' 8
In 1838, service during good behavior was removed. Judicial ap-
pointments were still made by the governor, although now with
the consent of the senate, and the terms of office were limited.' 9
Supreme Court justices-called judges at that time-served fif-
teen-year terms and common pleas court judges served ten-year
terms.20 While some Democratic -party efforts to make the office of
judge an elected position failed,21 for the first time in the Com-
monwealth's history, members of the "minor judiciary," then called
"justices of the peace," were elected in local wards, boroughs, and
townships to five-year terms. 22 It has been suggested that this
change was intended to "enlarge the powers of the electorate at
the expense of the executive." 23
In 1850, whether attributable to "Jacksonian Democracy" 24 or a
desire "to increase judicial independence and stature,"25 Pennsyl-
vanians abandoned the appointment method of judicial selection
and instituted popular elections.26 Supreme Court judges were
elected to fifteen-year terms, while common pleas court judges
were elected to ten-year terms. Some authors have suggested that
this change in judicial selection methods was an attempt to free
the judiciary from "the corrosive effects of politics" and to enable
judges to "restrain legislative power."2 7 Other authors have sug-
gested that the shift to the election of judges in the nineteenth
century was not "a thoughtful response to concerns over the inde-
pendence or integrity of the judiciary . . . [but rather] a response to
the populist fervor that inundated the nation at the time, affecting
18. CHARLES M. SNYDER, THE JACKSONIAN HERITAGE: PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS 1833-
1848, at 96 (1958).
19. PA. cONST. of 1838 art. V, § 2.
20. Id.
21. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 104.
22. PA. cONST. of 1838, art. V, § 7.
23. SNYDER, supra note 18, at 105.
24. THE COMMITTEE OF 70, supra note 12, at 11-15. "Jacksonian Democracy" "was
characterized by a commitment to democracy, which inciluded the extension of the franchise
...,the breakdown of class distinctions, opposition to monopoly and special privilege, so-
cial legislation to improve the lot of debtors, and the defense of state sovereignty."
SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND ESSAYS 27 (2d ed. 1991).
25. Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elec-
tions, 39 WILLAMETTE L.REV. 1397, 1399-1400 (2003).
26. PA. CONST. of 1838, Art. V, § 2 (1850).
27. Schotland, supra note 25, at 1400 (citing Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial:
State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 44 HISTORIAN
337, 338-39 (1983)).
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all of its institutions."28 Still others have suggested that the coun-
try's embrace of Jacksonian Democracy, and, in particular, the
adoption of elected versus appointed judges, was really attributa-
ble to "the triumph of 'emotion' over 'reason."'129 Whatever the true
reason, the year 1850 ushered in an era of a fully elected judiciary
in Pennsylvania, one that has now endured for 160 years.
By the 1870s the notion of an elected judiciary began to fall out
of favor for some in Pennsylvania. Advocates of change argued
that judicial selection should not be tied to partisan politics.
30
During the 1872-73 constitutional convention, a majority of the
judiciary committee recommended a return to appointing judges,
while opponents recommended continuing the electoral system.
31
Proponents of the elective system argued that the quality of judges
had improved since the advent of judicial elections and that if the
citizens were fit to select their governor, they were fit to select
their judges.32 Opponents argued that the elective system forced
judges to be politicians, subject to political dealings, 33 and that the
voters were not competent to select good judges.34
Ultimately the only change in judicial selection resulting from
the 1874 Constitution was that the terms of office of Supreme
Court judges were increased to twenty-one years, but without the
possibility for reelection, while the terms of common pleas court
judges remained at ten years.35
Shortly after judicial elections became the law in Pennsylvania,
efforts to reduce partisan political influences on the judiciary be-
gan. 36  Bar associations across the country advocated taking
judges out Of politics. 37 The concept of nonpartisan judicial elec-
tions was first suggested in the 1870s, as a means of "forc[ing]
28. Montgomery & Conner, supra note 10, at Z (quoting HARRY P. STUMPF & JOHN H.
CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURiTS 38 (1992)).
29. The Case for Judicial Appointments, supra note 10, at 359 (quoting Caleb Nelson, A
Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanation for the Rise of Elective Judiciary in Antebellum
America, 37 Am. J.LEGAL HIST. 190, 191 (1993)).
30. THE COMMITTEE OF 70, supra note 12, at 15.
31. Id. (citing 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1872-73,
PENNSYLVANIA 412 (1873).
32. Id. at 16 (citing 3 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA 706, 747 (1873).
33. Id. at 16 (citing 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA 54-55 (1873).
34. Id. at 16 (citing 3 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 32, at 743).
35. PA. CONST. of 1874 art. V, §§ 2, 15.
36. THE COMMITTEE OF 70, supra note 12, at 15.
37. Id.
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voters to select judges based on merit rather than party affilia-
tion," and to "take the judges out Of politics."38 Nonpartisan judi-
cial elections were offered as a compromise between gubernatorial
appointment and partisan elections.39 In 1913, Governor Tenor
signed legislation requiring judicial candidates for courts of record
to be elected through nonpartisan ballots.40 However this law was
repealed in 192141 and partisan elections were reinstated.42 The
failure of this initiative has been attributed to the reality that de-
spite nonpartisan ballots "political leaders continued to control the
slating of many candidates while the ballots became clogged with
numerous unknown judicial hopefuls." 43
The concept of nonpartisan ballots for judicial elections resur-
faced in the 1940s and 1950s, mainly in connection with an ap-
pointive method for judicial selection. The 1959 Report of the
Commission on Constitutional Revision (Woodside Commission
Report) supported the so-called "Pennsylvania Plan," which called
for nonpartisan retention elections for appellate court jurists who
would initially be appointed to a brief term by the governor.44 The
purpose of the recommendation was, in part, to remove judges
from partisan politics.4 5 Nonpartisan retention elections, after a
brief appointive term by the governor or chief justice, were also
recommended by the Governor's Commission on Constitutional
Revision in 1964 46 and by the Pennsylvania Bar Association in
1966.47
The Woodside Commission examined the various methods of
judicial selection used across the country and concluded that the
elective system was "not adequate to determine the ability of a
judge."4 8 The majority of commission members supported appoint-
38. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
39. THE COMMITTEE OF 70, supra note 12, at 18.
40. Act of July 24, 1913, No. 457, 1913 Pa. Laws 1001 (repealed 1921).
41. Act of May 10, 192 1, No. 199, 1921 Pa. Laws 426.
42. Act of May 10, 192 1, No. 198, 1921 Pa. Laws 423.
43. Montgomery & Conner, supra note 10, at 9.
44. COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, REPORT WITH RESPECT TO THE
JUDICIARY art. V, § 25 (1959) [hereinafter WOODSIDE COMMISSION REPORT].
45. See PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, THE
JUDICIARY: REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, 379 (1968) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5].
46. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, REPORT, WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS OF RESOLUTIONS TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY § 7
(1964); REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 45, at 417-19.
47. PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED JUDICIARY ARTICLE § 7 (1966);
REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 45, at 383-85, 389-90 (alternate proposal).
48. WOODSIDE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44; REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra
note 45, at 379.
896 Vol. 48
Fall 2010Elections in Pennsylvania89
ing judges to the bench for a short term, followed by a retention
system.49 The commission members believed
that politicians, rather than the people, select the nominee for
judicial office under [the elective] system and that this selec-
tion is determined not primarily on the basis of judicial ability
but rather on the basis of extrajudicial considerations, such as
party affiliation, membership in a particular racial or reli-
gious group, and patronage considerations. 50
Nationally, the American Bar Association's 1962 Model State
Judicial Article similarly suggested executive appointments to fill
judicial vacancies followed by retention elections. 51 In 1967, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice endorsed the principle of retention elections "as the best
way to protect judges from 'undue political influence and to in-
crease their independence. "'52
Despite numerous calls for change in the method of judicial se-
lection, the issue was not formally taken up in Pennsylvania until
the 1967-68 constitutional convention.
111. 1967-68 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Prior to the 1967-68 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, a
preparatory committee was created "to compile alternative pro-
posals for constitutional changes to be considered by the conven-
tion."5 3 In a 1967 Statement to the Preparatory Committee by the
League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, nonpartisan retention
elections after a brief appointive term would "help to keep the
courts out of politics and politics out of the courts."54 Regarding a
proposed selection process combining partisan elections for judges,
49. Judge Woodside however was in the minority and favored an elected judiciary. See
WOODSIDE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44.
50. Id.; REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 45, at 379.
51. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE (1962); REFERENCE
MANUAL NO. 5, supra note 45, at 394-98.
52. THE COMMITTlEE OF 70, supra note 12, at 19 (quoting SUSAN B. CARBON & LARRY C.
BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (American Judicature Society
1980) (discussing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE (1967)).
53. REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 45, at v.
54. League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, Statement to the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tional Convention Preparatory Committee, Task Force Hearing on the Judiciary Article
(July 1967).
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followed by nonpartisan retention elections, the Preparatory
Committee wrote:
This system combines the direct election by the people with a
nonpartisan, noncompetitive reelection, but it eliminates the
rigors of a campaign for the incumbent judge, retains his skill
and experience and permits the, electorate to pass on his qua-
lifications and fitness for office as demonstrated by his prior
term of office.55
As noted above, the so-called "Pennsylvania Plan" proposed
judicial appointments, followed by nonpartisan retention elections.
On the retention election aspect of this plan, the Preparatory
Committee wrote:
The proponents of the Pennsylvania Plan feel that the provi-
sion for an election to decide whether a judge is to be retained
gives the electorate sufficient democratic control over the ju-
diciary. The election contemplated does not follow the usual
type of political campaign, since the judge who seeks to be re-
tained for a regular term runs on his own record. He does not
have to spend the time, physical and mental energy, nor the
money required by a typical partisan, competitive campaign.
His only investment in effort and money to be retained is in
the work he has put into his judicial duties to gain a satisfac-
tory record and in the cost of a postage stamp used to notify
the election officials that he desires to be retained for another
term. 56
The Preparatory Committee also heard from opponents of a re-
tention election system for judges. The committee wrote:
[O1pponents of this system maintain that it is difficult to re-
move an incompetent judge under this system. . .. Since there
is no opposition in the reelection, the duty of campaigning
against the incumbent judge falls upon lawyers, who are put
in the delicate position of opposing a judge before whom the
lawyers may be required to appear, at the time of the cam-
paign or in the future. Under this situation, there will be no
real contest and unless there are two contestants, there is no
doubt about the outcome of the race.. .. Former Judge Wood-
55. REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 45, at 116.
56. Id. at 132.
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side, speaking in opposition to a merit plan for selection of
Judges, observed about the possibility of unseating a judge
running for reelection on a noncompetitive ballot "Where offi-
cials are 'elected' on a 'Yes' or 'No' vote, approval is nearly un-
animous. 'You cannot lick somebody with nobody,' is a tried
and accepted political slogan, even in America." 57
During the convention numerous proposals were debated con-
cerning judicial selection. 58 Most of these debates surrounded the
method for initial judicial selection (appointment vs. election).
Delegate (and former governor) William Scranton said the ques-
tion of judicial selection "was the most contentious and the most
contested of all the portions of [the judiciary] article within the
committee." 59 On the selection of judges, Delegate Stout wrote:
"we found this issue to be the 'hottest,' most controversial issue of
this Convention." 60
Delegates were bitterly divided, not only on the best method for
initial judicial selection, but also on the question of nonpartisan
retention elections. Some delegates bristled at the concept of me-
rit-retention. Delegate Keller suggested retention elections would
functionally ensure lifetime appointments, calling the concept the
"till death do us part" proposal.61 In urging the defeat of the me-
rit-retention proposal, Delegate Fohl argued, "The very same
people who yesterday and in previous days were telling us the
people are not knowledgeable enough to vote for the judges [in the
first instance] are now telling us that they are knowledgeable
enough to vote 'yes' or 'no' a short time later [in a retention elec-
tion] *"62 Delegate Goldman, who would later support merit-
retention, questioned how voters would know whether a judge is
good or bad when they have nothing to compare with him.63
Other delegates believed merit-retention elections were neces-
sary to lessen the influence of partisan politics on sitting judges.64
57. Id. at 116 (citing the Report of the Commission on Constitutional Revision, 1959,
Minority Statement, 215).
58. See e.g., 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-
68,at 94-99, 122-27, 148-52, 161, 172-84, 207-08, 225-33, 288-95, 309-13, 315, 322-23, 444-
49 (1969). See also REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 45, at 101-116; THE COMMITTEE
OF 70, supra note 12, at 20.
59. Debates of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1967-68, vol. 1, pg. 448.
60. Debates of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1967-68, vol. 11, pg. 1235.
61. Id. at 1043.
62. Id. at 1082.
63. Id.
64. See e.g., 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-
68,, aupra note 58, at 94-99 (Proposal No. 1000), 122-27 (Proposal No. 1011), 147-52 (Pro-
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Delegate Burkholder stated that "yes-no" retention elections were
the way to reduce political influences on judges in office.6 5 Near
the end of the convention, Delegate Goldman said nonpartisan
retention elections "keep [judges] out of politics, running solely
and exclusively on their own background, on their own ability as
they have proven it in their preceding term."6 6
On February 26, 1968, in the closing days of the convention and
after days of impasse, an amendment was introduced that would
lead to the current Constitution's Article V. The amendment
called for partisan elections, followed by nonpartisan "merit reten-
tion" elections for all common pleas and appellate court judges. It
also called for the voters at the 1969 primary election to determine
if the Commonwealth's appellate court judges should be selected
by the governor from a list of names submitted by a Judicial No-
minating Commission.67 This compromise position eventually lead
to the current Article V, Sections 13 and 15.
On April 23, 1968, Pennsylvanians adopted the current Consti-
tution. Supreme Court justices, appellate and common pleas court
judges are elected to ten-year terms.68 Philadelphia municipal
and traffic court judges and magisterial district court judges are
elected to six-year terms.69 All of these jurists, except magisterial
district court judges, may seek reelection to office by running in
nonpartisan retention elections. 70
The 1969 ballot question on judicial appointments for appellate
court judges failed by a vote of 643,960 to 624,453.71
IV. MERIT-RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE CURRENT JUDICIAL
SELECTION DEBATE
While the debate continues to this day over the best method for
the initial selection of Pennsylvania judges, recommendations to
change judicial selection over the past forty years have repeatedly
posal No. 1031), 172-78 (Proposal No. 1054), 207-08 (Proposal No. 1087) and 290-95 (Pro-
posal No. 1174).
65. 2 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-68, at
1081 (1969).
66. Id. at 1242.
67. Id. at 1241-42.
68. PA. cONST. art. V, § 15(a).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 15(b).
71. ROBERT E. WOODISIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558 (1985).
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advocated continuing the use of merit-retention elections as a way
of limiting partisan political influences on judicial selection. 72
For example, in 1981, the Committee to Study Pennsylvania's
Unified Judicial System, chaired by former Justice Thomas W.
Pomeroy, Jr. (Pomeroy Report) recommended that all appellate
court judges in the state should be appointed by the governor for
an initial term of two years, and then stand for election on a non-
partisan ballot. The committee further recommended retaining
the nonpartisan "merit-retention" system established in the 1968
Constitution.73
In 1988 Governor Casey's Judicial Reform Commission (Beck
Commission Report) recommended that appellate court judges
serve an initial four-year term through gubernatorial appoint-
ment, and then be required to stand for election in a non-partisan
retention election if they wish to continue in office. 74"
In the wake of the Beck Commission Report a statewide non-
profit, nonpartisan organization called Pennsylvanians for Modern
Courts (PMC) was established with the goal of enhancing public
confidence in the judiciary. A principal mission of this organiza-
tion has been to promote an appointment system of judicial selec-
tion. Like the 1969 referendum, as well as the Pomeroy and Beck
Commission Reports, PMC's proposal calls for the gubernatorial
appointment of judges from a list of candidates forwarded by a
nominating commission, followed by nonpartisan, uncontested
retention elections.75 Likewise, the League of Women Voters of
Pennsylvania supports retention elections for trial and appellate
judges.76
In 2007, the Pennsylvania Commission on Judicial Indepen-
dence 77 contacted former delegates to the 1967-68 constitutional
72. Ironically, at least one author has suggested the change from an appointive judicial
selection method to partisan elections was itself an attempt to free the judiciary from "the
corrosive effects of politics." Schotland, supra note 25, at 1400 (quoting Hall, supra note 27,
at 337).
73. THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY PENNSYLVANIA'S UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THOMAS W.
POMEROY, JR., CHAIRMAN 81, 89-92 (1981).
74. GOVERNOR'S JUDICIAL REFORM COMMISSION, PHYLLIS W. BECK, CHAIRPERSON 155-
56 (1988). Interestingly the question of judicial selection was the only issue that generated
a significant dissenting report. Id. at 202-38.
75. Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, What is Merit Selection?,
http://www.pmconlinc.org/nodc/27 (last visited June 30, 2010).
76. League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, Judiciary,
http://pailwv.org/issues/Judiciary.htmi (last visited Aug. 12, 2010)
77. The Pennsylvania Commission on Judicial Independence was officially empanelled
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2005. Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania,
Judicial Independence Commission,
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convention, and asked about the purpose behind merit-retention
elections. Five former delegates provided the following statement:
The delegates to the 1968 Constitutional Convention
wanted to ensure that Pennsylvania judges, after serving an
initial term in office, would be reelected in a non-political
manner based on the merits of their performance in office.
The Constitution born of that convention provided, for the
first time in Pennsylvania history, that judges were to be ree-
lected not in partisan political contests but by a new method
called retention. When seeking reelection, each judge would
have the opportunity to stand before voters on his or her
record in a neutral, non-confrontational referendum. Voters
would approve or disapprove each judge with a "yes"~ or "'no"~
vote.
This reelection method was designed to keep judges out of
the political fray while at the same time holding them accoun-
table to the voters based on their overall performance in of-
fice.
Under the retention system, the public is able to evaluate
its judges while the judges are able to maintain their inde-
pendence which is essential to their role in our democratic
system of government.
In making retention part of the Constitution, the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention hoped and expected that
voters would evaluate judges not on any single issue or deci-
sion, but rather on their full records and with the understand-
ing that the sole duty of all judges is to uphold the law, unin-
fluenced by any form of outside pressure.78
Current and former elected officials in Pennsylvania have re-
peatedly called for a change in how the state initially selects
judges, but proposals consistently endorse the concept of merit-
retention elections for additional terms in office. In June 2010
http://www.aopc.org/T/BoardsCommittees/CourtRelatedPanelslndependeneCommission.h
tm (last visited Aug. 12, 2010). Its principal goals are to "fostero a better understanding of
the role of the courts in a democracy and [to] counteri unfair attacks on the judiciary." Id.
78. This statement was signed in April 2007 by former delegates Holbrook M. Bunting,
Jr., Esquire, William F. Clinger, Jr., Esquire, Hon. Robert E. J. Curran, Hon. John W.
Keller, Joseph M. More, Esquire, and by Marvin Comsiky, Esquire, who served as General
Counsel to the Convention. Statement of Delegates to the 1968 Constitutional Conve~ntion:
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current Governor Rendell was joined by three former governors-
Hon. Richard Thornburgh, Hon. Thomas Ridge and Hon. Mark
Schweiker-in calling for the appointment of appellate court
judges, followed by a nonpartisan election after serving four years,
and a retention election every ten years thereafter. 79 Similarly
legislation has been introduced numerous times in the Pennsylva-
nia general assembly since the 1970s, most recently in the 2009-
2010 legislative session, calling for a constitutional amendment
establishing an appointment process for judicial selection, followed
by retention elections. 80
Efforts to implement an appointment process for judicial selec-
tion in Pennsylvania have existed in one form or another virtually
since the Commonwealth switched to judicial elections in 1850.
But nearly every effort to move away from judicial elections since
1969 has included merit retention elections at some point after an
initial appointive term. Arguments can still be made that a reten-
tion election system is ideal as it allows a judge to run on his or
her "record," giving the voters an opportunity to pass on the
judges "qualifications and fitness for office as demonstrated by his
prior term." 81 Conversely, some may still argue that nonpartisan
"4yes"~ or "no"~ retention elections have a limited value since judges
are rarely defeated, 82 and as the preparatory committee to the
1967-68 constitutional convention wrote: "Under [the retention
election] system there will be no real contest, and unless there are
two contestants, there is no doubt about the outcome of the race."83
79. Angela, Couloumbis, Rendell Presses for Merit-Based Judge Selections, PHILA.
INQUIRER, June 10, 2010,
http://www.philly.com/philly/newsfbreaking/20100609-Rendell-presses for merit-
basedjudge-selections.html.
80. See e.g., S.B. 860, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.B. 1621, 2009-10 Leg.,
Reg. Sess, (Pa. 2009).
81. REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 45, at 116.
82. Rarely are judges in Pennsylvania defeated in retention elections. The most nota-
ble defeat came in 2005, when Justice Russell Nigro was narrowly defeated in his bid for
retention by less than 30,000 votes. During that same year, Justice Sandra Schultz New-
man was retained with 54.1% of the votes. See Pa. Dep't of State, Elections Information,
http://www.clectionrctums.statc.pa.us/Electionslnfor-mation.aspx?Functionl D=1I2&ElectionlD=19 (last
visited Aug. 12, 2010). In 2007, a concerted effort, led primarily by mid-state political ac-
tivists, to remove judges running for retention in Pennsylvania failed. See e.g., Election
Aftermath: Retentions Didn't Change Need for Reform, THE MORNING CALL, November 12,
2007, http://articles.mcall.com/2007-Il--12/news/3803948_1_judgs-dbat-anid-amcndmcnts-
lawmakcrs. Only one judge from the court of common pleas in Bradford County was not
retained; however, it is uncertain that his defeat was attributable to a statewide "vote no"
effort. See Cheryl R. Clarke, Mott Says That His Bench Record Should Be Deciding
Factor, WILLAIMSPORT SUN CAZETrE, November 4, 2007,
http://w-ww.sungazettc.com/pagc/contcnt.detail/id/500543.html?nav-501 4.
83. REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, sutpra note 45, at 116.
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V. ENHANCING THE UTILITY OF MERIT-RETENTION ELECTIONS
Leaving positions for or against a nonpartisan, uncontested re-
tention election system for incumbent judges aside, arguably the
value and utility of Pennsylvania's retention election system is
enhanced when the citizens are informed. This was clearly a con-
cern to some of the delegates to the 1967-68 convention.84 Histori-
cally, efforts to provide relevant information to voters with regard
to judges running for retention have come from one or two sources:
the media or the organized bar associations. In the year 2000, the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial Inde-
pendence issued a report on state judicial selection standards.
The committee recommended the following criteria for judicial
selection and retention:
Standard A. 1: Selection Criteria. Judicial selection criteria
should include, but not necessarily be limited to:
(i) Experience. A candidate for judicial office should
be a member of the Bar of the highest court of a state
for at least 10 years and have been engaged in the
practice or teaching of law, public interest law, or
service in the judicial system.
(ii) Integrity. The candidate should be of high moral
character and enjoy a general reputation in the
community for honesty, industry and diligence.
(iii) Professional Competence. Professional compe-
tence includes intellectual capacity, professional and
personal judgment, writing and analytical ability,
knowledge of the law and breadth of professional ex-
perience, including courtroom and trial experience.
Candidates for appellate judgeships should further
demonstrate scholarly writing and academic talent,
and the ability to write to develop a coherent body of
law.
84. See e.g., Debates of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1967-68, vol. 11,
pg. 1081-82 (Delegate Goldman argued "[iut seems ridiculous in this day and age to contin-
ue having [judges] elected by the people when they do not really know who they are . .. if
people do not even know the man's name, how will they know whether he has been good or
bad?").
904 Vol. 48
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(IV) Judicial Temperament. Judicial temperament in-
cludes a commitment to equal justice under law,
freedom from bias, ability to decide issues according
to law, courtesy and civility, open-mindedness and
compassion.
(v) Service to the Law and Contribution to the Effec-
tive Administration of Justice. Service to the law and
contribution to the effective administration of justice
includes professionalism and a commitment to im-
proving the availability of providing justice to all
those within the jurisdiction.
Standard A.2: Retention Criteria. In addition to the criteria
set forth in Standard A.1, in evaluating the judicial perfor-
mance of a judge standing for retention election, the following
should be considered:
preparation, attentiveness and control over judicial
proceedings;
judicial management skills;
courtesy to litigants, counsel and court personnel;
public disciplinary sanctions; and
quality of judicial opinions.
These selection and retention criteria were approved by the Amer-
ican Bar Association House of Delegates in July 2000. 85
Some organizations and civic groups have suggested utilizing an
organized method for gathering this information on judges seeking
another term through a retention election, and making that in-
formation available to the public through an evaluation system or
through voter guides.86 The League of Women Voters of Pennsyl-
85. A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS 7 (2000),
http://new.abanet.org/committees/Judind/PublicDocuments/reformat.pd. Similarly, the
Pennsylvania Bar Association has published "traits" for voters to consider when initially
voting for a judge. See C. Dale McClain, Ten Traits to Consider When Voting for Judges,
http://www.pavotesmart.com/TenTraitstoConsiderVhenVotingforJudgesOp-ed.pd.
86. The Beck Commission recommended that the Judicial Nominating Commission
(charged initially with nominating potential jurists to the governor) would also reevaluate
each judge or justice seeking a full or subsequent term through retention, and state its
conclusions publicly. Governor's Judicial Reform Commission, supra note 69, at 38. See
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vania has published a guide suggesting "how to judge the judges"
and listing sources of information on judicial candidates. 87 During
election years, the League of Women Voters publishes a voters'
guide, including information on judicial retention election candi-
dates.88 Likewise, the Pennsylvania Bar Association has estab-
lished a website where a significant amount of information on
statewide candidates for retention may be found.89 These infor-
mation sources are valuable, especially to voters who otherwise
may have no knowledge of a judge's identity, let alone his or her
record.
The Pennsylvania Commission on Judicial Independence has
suggested that the media and all county bar associations in Penn-
sylvania should likewise make similar relevant information avail-
able to the county electorate voting in retention elections for com-
mon pleas court judges.90 Arguably the value and utility of the
information provided by the bar associations and the civic organi-
zations would be further enhanced if additional elements from the
American Bar Association's suggested retention criteria were in-
cluded. 91
also Mark Neville, Whether We Elect Judges or Merit Select Them, Voters Need to Be Edu-
cated, PATRIOT-NEWS, November 12, 2009,
bttp://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index.ssf/2009/11i/whether-we-elect-judges ormer.htm
1.
87. See League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, How to Judge the Judges: Judicial
Election Information for Voters, http://palwv.org/lwv/pubs/Judgethejudges.pdf (last visited
Aug. 12, 2010)
88. See League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, Voters' Guide,
http://palwv.org/voting/vote.html.
89. See PAVoteSmart, Judicial Election Information, http://www.pavotesmart.org/ (last
visited Aug. 12, 2010).
90. In Philadelphia County this would include information on judges elected to the
Philadelphia municipal court and the Philadelphia traffic court.
91. The Pennsylvania Bar Association (PBA), through its Judicial Evaluation Commis-
sion asks judicial retention candidates to voluntarily complete a questionnaire and provide
representative writing samples. These are reviewed by an investigative panel, which may
also conduct interviews with other individuals. The panel then meets with the retention
candidate and submits a report to the commission. The commission reviews the informa-
tion provided and issues a rating of either "recommended" or "not recommended" for reten-
tion. Candidates who do not participate in the evaluation process are given a rating of "not
recommended for failure to participate in the evaluation process." Ratings are made public
via news releases and the PBA Web site. See Pennsylvania Bar Association, Judicial Eval-
uation Commissions Evaluation Procedures, http://www.pavotesmart.org/aboutJEC.pdf
(last visited Aug. 12, 2010).
The League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania provides similar information on its
website regarding the retention election system and retention candidates. All judicial
retention candidates are asked to list their education, occupation and qualifications for this
office, and to answer a question. For example, in 2009 candidates were asked to give their
opinion on the judicial disciplinary system. See League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania,
Nonpartisan Voters Guide: Municipal Election, November 3, 2009,
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is unknown if Pennsylvanians will decide to change the way
they select judges. While the effort to move to an appointive sys-
tem of judicial selection has persisted for over 40 years, no initia-
tive or legislation has come closer than the 1969 referendum,
which failed by less than 20,000 votes. Nevertheless, the move-
ment appears reenergized through the efforts of advocacy groups
and elected representatives. Regardless of the method ultimately
selected for the initial appointment of jurists, however, it appears
likely that Pennsylvanians will continue to have a direct vote on
which jurists are permitted to remain in office after their initial
term, through the state's 40 year old merit-retention election sys-
tem.
http://palwv.org/voting/2009NVGFaIl2009.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2010). In 2007, candi-
dates were asked to explain what the phrase "judicial independence" means to them. See
League of Womieni Voters of Pennsylvania, 2007 Campaign Voters Guide,
http://palwv.org/members/2007/Fall%/202007%/20Voters%/20Guide.pdf (last visited Aug. 12,
2010). As with the PBA evaluations, participation is voluntary.
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